July 22, 2007 at Point Arena, California
There is an important matter up before a nation’s government. A person who disagrees with me gets one vote. I get the equivalent of 1/35th of a vote.
Is that fair? Is that how a democracy should work?
Is this bizarre mockery of democracy taking place in Cuba or Iran? No. It is taking place here in the United States of America, and it is how the business of government has been done here for over 200 years.
I live in California, which as I write this essay in 2007 has a population of about 35 million. There are six states with populations under one million: Alaska, Delaware, North Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming.
Each state elects to persons to the U. S. Senate, where they have equal votes. The U.S. Senate is an important place. It shares many powers with the House of Representatives, which are listed for the most part in Section 8 of the Constitution. It also has some exclusive powers: “the sole power to try all impeachments,” to advise and consent (or not) to treaties negotiated by the President; and advise and consent to appointments of Ambassadors, Supreme Court and other federal judges, and “All other officers of the United States.”
The people of California engage in commerce that results in an immense trade with foreign nations, but when it comes to trade treaties, we get the same say as less than 1 million people in South Dakota.
Almost everyone in the United States has been taught how this sad state of affairs came about. When slavery was declared abolished on England’s soil in 1772 a group of slavers in certain American colonies of the British Empire called upon certain men in New England whose friends were involved in the slave trade and decided it was time to make sure that the soil of the American colonies was not considered English soil. This group was called the Committees of Correspondence. Leaders of 13 colonies joined in the enterprise; in the original Articles of Confederation each colony received one vote in Congress.
When an even more conservative group of rich white men became unhappy with the direction of the United States of America some of their representatives came together in 1787 to write an even more conservative (favorable to the rich) set of rules for national government. As a compromise between the states with smaller populations, who wanted to stick with the one-state, one-vote formula, and the states with larger populations, who wanted representation according to population (including slaves), was made. Each state got 2 Senators. Each got at least one member in the House of Representatives, and states got more in proportion to their populations. Slavery was also enshrined and protected in this Constitution.
When the first national census was taken in 1790 Virginia had the largest population with 747,000; Delaware the smallest, with 59,000. The inequality ratio of the Senate was about 12.5 in this worst case, but the six middling-population states had populations varying between 142,000 and 395,000, so most states found having 2 Senators to be tolerable.
Why, when the U.S. preaches democracy with bombs and bullets, is there not more talk about the gross inequalities caused by the U.S. Senate? Partly because for most laws to pass, they must also pass in the House of Representatives, where one-citizen, one-vote is observed to a reasonable degree.
The other reason is that entrenched interests that are opposed to democracy like the Senate. This goes back to the real purpose of the Senate. It was always supposed to be an elite, non-democratic institution. The gentlemen slavers of the State of Virginia wanted more seats in the Senate in 1788 not because they wanted democracy, but because they wanted more of a say within an oligarchy.
The U.S. Senate was modeled after two institutions: the ancient Roman Senate (hence its name) and the modern House of Lords in Great Britain. Washington and crew imagined themselves Lords; the Senate provided was recognition of their superior status as well as control of the most important features of the new national government.
Note that the relatively democratic House of Representatives was given no power over the appointment of officials, including the Supreme Court. They are not even allowed to have a say in treaties with foreign powers. This includes the Free Trade agreements so popular with the international corporate elite of late. These trade agreements have, effectively, diminished the ability of the House of Representatives to pass laws for the economic good of U.S. citizens.
It should also be noted that in the original Constitution the members of the U.S. Senate were not directly elected. In stead they were selected by the upper houses of the state legislatures. That defect was cured by the 17th Amendment.
I would certainly prefer to see the Senate elected by proportional representation rather than keeping the current system. But at this point in the evolution of the U.S. Constitution, I believe the best course would be to amend the Constitution to abolish the Senate and give its powers to the House of Representatives. This would streamline the government as well as making it more democratic.
(A Response to Paulson Committee efforts as described in "Businesses Seek Protection on Legal Front" by Stephen Labaton in the 10/29/2006 New York Times)
by William P. Meyers (bill@iiipublishing.com)
Free markets being the wonderful, demi-god like things that they are, I think that it is time to set up a regulatory agency for thieves. No, not the Enron kind of thief, I mean the ordinary, shoplifting, house burgling, knock-you over the head and get the $16 that is in your wallet type of thief. Just as corporate America and the American people have benefitted from business regulations, we would all benefit from the regulation of thieves. On the national level we would set up a Thieves and Burglars Commission (TBC).
The most immediate impact of regulating thieves would be the reduction of the number of thieves in prison. In most states the maintenance of prisoners is, on a percentage basis, one of the top government expenses. That means state and local taxes are far higher than they would be if the prisons needed to hold fewer prisoners. Most tax payers lose far more to such taxes than they do to thieves. Since thieves would no longer be criminals, but rather would be joining the world of businessmen, it is even possible that their increased activity would be economically beneficial.
How would the system work? Like any other regulatory system. All thieves would have to register with the TBC and fill out paperwork on a regular basis. Congress or the state legislatures would give some general guidance, but mostly leave the making of regulations to the TBC. The more organized thieves would lobby the TBC to make sure that regulations are fair to thieves and that the paperwork not be too burdensome. The public would have input too, but it would be ignored most of the time.
It is hard to predict how exactly the regulations might work out, but by examining the regulations created by the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and other existing agencies we can get a general idea about the TBC regulations. A certain degree of thievery would be tolerated as completely legal. Say any single act of theft not involving violent harm to an individual and having proceeds valued at less than $200.00. However, thieves would have to record these incidents and pay all appropriate local, state, and federal taxes on the proceeds (less deductions for business expenses).
In a second tier, say $200 to $5,000, there would be a small fine involved. This would help defray the costs of running the TBC. Also, the citizen whose money or property had been stolen would have the right to apply to the agency to recover part of the theft, say 20%, if they were willing to spend years going through the TBC bureaucracy to do that.
Thefts larger than $5,000 would be strictly prohibited. The TBC would be allowed two or three enforcement officers to police the entire country to make sure this did not happen too often. If caught violating this regulation a thief would have to turn over everything over $5000 to the TBC, apologize to the victim, and be prohibited under penalty of actual jail time from thieving from said victim for a period of 5 years.
For those worried about violence, a separate penalty for each incidence of violence accompanying a theft would surely make thieves think twice about their business methods. Same for arson.
Thus (as with our current environmental, banking, and securities law) business thieves could make a rational choice as to when to engage in activities discouraged by regulation.
A whole new era of prosperity awaits our society. Thieves would serve the markets, transferring funds from those who have too many to those that are underpaid for their business activities because of market inefficiencies. Young men would finally have a reason to learn to read and write, so that they can fill out the necessary paperwork. Taxes would be down. Instilled with the pride of legality, once they amassed some capital thieves might even move into other legitimate businesses like floating small loans, becoming stock brokers, or even real-estate speculation.
It is time to realize that humans can’t be free until markets are free, and markets can’t be free while profitable activities are against the law. The most important thing about the regulatory apparatus is that it not be burdensome on those who would be making the world a better place through business activities.
There is one dark side to the regulatory system. Often those who are regulated actually seek to make regulations more burdensome in order to prevent new players from entering their markets. They might, for instance, insist that new thieves post a bond against future fines. This and other economic hurdles would defeat the very purpose of the regulatory system.
But that is all in the future. The important thing right now is to set our businesses free of the yoke of hard and fast laws that outlaw all activities without considering their relative merit to our business economy.
Copyright 2006 by William P. Meyers
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